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On Having Reasons for Perceptual Beliefs: 
A Sellarsian Perspective 
 
 
Dan D. Crawford 
 
Albright College 
 
Abstract 
I interpret and defend Sellars’ internalist view of perceptual justification which argues that perceiv-
ers have evidence for their perceptual beliefs that includes a higher-order belief about the circum-
stances in which those beliefs arise, and an epistemic belief about the reliability of beliefs that are 
formed in those circumstances. The pattern of inference that occurs in ordinary cases of perception 
is elicited. 
I then defend this account of perceptual evidence against (1) Alston’s objection that ordinary per-
ceivers are not as critical and reflective as this view requires them to be, and (2) the charge that in-
ternalism leads to various forms of infinite regress and circular reasoning. It is granted that subjects 
must have further grounds for their justifying reasons, and an attempt is made to identify these sec-
ond-order reasons. In particular, I argue that epistemic beliefs are grounded in the perceiver’s aware-
ness that his present experience-cum-conditions fits into a larger pattern of similar past experiences 
that were reliably connected with their objects. 
 
Our question is whether ordinary perceivers have reasons that justify their perceptions. 
Drawing on the account of perceptual justification developed by Wilfrid Sellars in his later 
papers on the subject, I will argue that they do, and will attempt to elicit the pattern of 
inference that occurs in ordinary perceptual awareness. 
I begin with some preliminary definitions and an attempt to locate my position within 
the current internalism/externalism debate. I will take for granted a certain way of under-
standing and describing ordinary perceptual consciousness. When Seymour is perceiving 
visually that there is a green glass in front of him, I will say that a thought or propositional 
content characterizes his subjective state, and that this propositional content somehow cor-
responds to what he perceives, namely that there is a green glass there. Further, Seymour’s 
propositional attitude is one of believing this proposition. Thus when he perceives that 
there is a green glass there, he is occurrently thinking and believing that there is a green 
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glass there. I will refer to these propositional states, when they occur in a perceptual set-
ting, as perceptual beliefs, or pb’s.1 
I take it that in normal circumstances perceiving is a form of knowing about the things 
that exist outside of us. Seymour’s perceiving that there is a glass in front of him is a way 
of acquiring information about the glass, of gaining knowledge of the glass and some of 
its properties. And if his pb is an instance of knowledge, then it is justified for him. More-
over, I assume that his knowledge of this object and its properties is direct, in the sense that 
he does not reach his state of justified belief by any inference from a prior awareness of 
sensory input. To say that ordinary pb’s are noninferential then involves two claims: the 
psychological one that pb’s are not arrived at by inferential reasoning from any prior belief 
about how one is sensing, and the epistemological one that the knowledge one has in these 
cases is not based upon a prior knowledge of one’s subjective sensory state.2 Yet the thrust 
of the present argument is that even if ordinary pb’s are not products of these sorts of in-
ferences, nevertheless perceivers do have justifying reasons for them, though as we shall 
see of a very different sort. 
What is it for a person S to be justified in believing some proposition p? I will accept an 
account of justification according to which if S justifiably believes that p, then S has adequate 
evidence, reasons, or grounds for p.3 A great deal of controversy has surrounded the question 
of what it is for one to have a reason for some (occurrent) belief, and to base one’s belief on 
that reason. Clearly we do sometimes speak of S’s having a reason for his belief when S 
merely possesses evidence e for p, but does not utilize that evidence. (Indeed, S may have 
a reason to believe p even if S does not believe p.) But it seems that any evidence that S has 
in this weaker sense can only be S’s reason for p—the reason for which S believes p—if S relies 
on that evidence and bases his belief on it.4 Although some epistemologists have main-
tained that a belief can be justified for someone by another belief (or mental state) as long 
as the subject has access to that belief or state, and thus as long as it can become the reason 
for which S believes p,5 it seems intuitively clear that unless S somehow utilizes e as evi-
dence for p, then it is strictly only a potential reason for him to believe p.6 
I will argue then that perceptual beliefs (pb’s) stand in an inferential relation to some 
evidence or grounds that S has, and I will refer to the inference schema that formulates this 
evidence as a justificatory argument. Further, I make the assumption that if S justifiably be-
lieves p, then p is reasonable or justified for S in a sense which implies that S is likely to 
have gotten closer to the truth, to have taken possession of a truth. Thus I assume a funda-
mental link between the reasonableness of a proposition and its (probable) truth.7 
Recently epistemologists have been divided over the sorts of things that can be justifiers 
for beliefs. Internalists argue that beliefs can only be justified by other beliefs that lie within 
the subject’s perspective, while externalists maintain that what justifies a belief lies (at least 
partially) outside the subject’s perspective in the reliable mechanism that produces the be-
lief. Consider these three possible internalist requirements for justification: 
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Int1 If S’s belief that p is justified for S, then it is justified by some other belief(s) 
that S has. 
Int2 S justifiably believes p on the basis of some evidence e only if S is aware of 
e as his evidence for p. 
Int3 S justifiably believes p on the basis of some evidence e only if S believes 
that e is adequate evidence for p. 
 
These three requirements determine three increasingly strong internalist positions. The 
first position maintains that only beliefs (or awarenesses, or apprehensions)—all of which 
I take to be cognitive states—can justify other beliefs.8 Int2 asserts that S must in some sense 
grasp the evidence on which he bases his belief, and believe that it makes the belief rea-
sonable. And Int3 requires that S has the further belief that this evidence is good or suffi-
cient evidence for p. 
In the account of perceptual justification that follows, I will adopt the strong internalist 
position that includes all three requirements . However we will see that this strong position 
must allow that the evidence that perceivers have includes significant descriptive elements, 
thus opening the door for saying that a source of their justification lies in external factors. 
Thus I am proposing a mixed account of justificatory evidence. 
In the body of this paper, I will defend these internalist assumptions, first, by applying 
them to the perceptual case in a way that seems to illuminate what is going on there; and 
secondly, by rebutting some lines of criticism that have been brought against them. Specif-
ically, I take up William Alston’s objection that strong internalism requires too much so-
phistication on the part of ordinary perceivers. I will then try to deliver my account of 
perceptual evidence from charges that it leads to several forms of infinite regress and cir-
cular reasoning. In order to do this, I will have to consider whether ordinary perceivers 
have any further reasons for their justifying reasons, and will suggest the sort of meta-reasons 
they can plausibly be said to have. 
 
A Sellarsian View of Perceptual Justification 
 
I will attempt to elicit the justificatory evidence that perceivers have for their perceptions. 
My account of this evidence builds on Wilfrid Sellars’ theory of perceptual justification put 
forward originally in the seminal 1956 paper, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 
and more recently restated in the third of the Matchette lectures, given in 1971 and pub-
lished under the title “The Structure of Knowledge.” It is this later work that I will use to 
introduce this theory.9 
Sellars’ formulation of a justificatory argument is put in the context of a perceiver—the 
illustrious Jones—who is reconstructing his evidence for thinking that he has just seen a 
red apple in front of him. Jones reasons as follows: 
I just thought-out-loud “Lo! Here is a red apple” (no countervailing conditions 
obtain); So, there is good reason to believe that there is a red apple in front of me. 
(p. 342) 
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We may note that Jones’ reasoning is stated in terms of what Sellars calls the Verbal Be-
haviorist model of thinking according to which thoughts are identified with spontaneous 
utterances or thinkings-out-loud. Thus in the first premise of his inference, Jones expresses 
an awareness of the spontaneous thought he had in the previous moment. However Sellars 
certainly intends that this pattern of inference applies to perceptions in the full-blooded 
sense in which they involve thoughts as “inner” mental occurrences. Within this mental-
istic context, the first premise could be reformulated as: 
I just had the visual belief that there was a red apple in front of me. 
Commenting on Jones’ argument, Sellars writes: 
[Jones] did not originally infer that there is a red apple in front of him. Now, 
however, he is inferring from the character and context of his experience that it 
is veridical, and that there is good reason to believe that there is indeed a red 
apple in front of him. (p. 342) 
Jones’ original pb was not the product of any mental inference. However he subsequently 
thinks about his evidence and reaches his conclusion by a process of mental reasoning. But 
it is important to realize that even if Jones formulated his grounds only after his perception 
occurred, Sellars is committed to saying that Jones had these grounds at the time that he 
perceived. Moreover, Jones must have been in some sense aware of his grounds, for Sellars 
explicitly requires that “to be the expression of knowledge, a report must not only have 
authority, this authority must in some sense be recognized by the person whose report it 
is” (Sellars, 1963, p. 168). 
Turning now to the given justificatory argument, some elaboration and comment is 
called for. First we should note that Jones’ evidence refers to the external circumstances in 
which his pb is occurring by means of the highly general (negative) premise that “no coun-
tervailing conditions obtain.” But this claim is compatible with the view that Jones’ belief 
about the circumstances surrounding his pb has a more determinate content than this. 
Typically it includes a reference to specific factors in the environment (e.g., lighting condi-
tions, position of the object), the sensory apparatus (eyes are working properly and are 
oriented correctly), and their interrelation (the eyes are being appropriately stimulated by 
the object). This is how I will interpret Sellars’ claim about Jones‘ awareness of “the context 
of his experience,” but I hasten to add that even if the belief does contain this specific con-
tent, it also includes an indefinite ceteris paribus clause to the effect that the situation is 
otherwise normal. 
A more important consideration is that when Jones argues that his pb is reasonable be-
cause it is occurring in normal conditions, he seems to be relying on an unstated premise, 
namely the generalization that pb’s of the kind he is having that occur in conditions of the kind 
he is in are reasonably believed.10 Thus Jones has already ascertained the conditions in which 
certain pb’s are reliable and is bringing this general knowledge to bear on his present ex-
perience. I will have more to say about this important premise, and what grounds Jones 
may have for it, in later sections of this paper. 
Finally, in another comment on Jones’ argument, Sellars states: “Like all justification 
arguments, it is a higher-order thinking” (p. 342). We are now in a position to see that this 
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is true in two respects. First, the argument includes a meta-belief about the original pb, 
namely that it is occurring in a certain physical context. And second, the conclusion of the 
argument involves the language of epistemic evaluation—the pb is thought to be reasona-
ble or worthy of belief. Furthermore, it may be recalled that Sellars described Jones as in-
ferring that his experience was “veridical,” thus revealing the assumption of a link between 
the concepts of justification and truth.11 
Bearing these points in mind, we can now state more fully the general form of the justi-
ficatory arguments that figure in ordinary perceptions. 
JA 1. My pb is occurring in (normal) conditions, a, b, c . . . 
 2. Pb’s of this kind (about objects of this type) that occur in such condi-
tions are reasonable (likely to be true) 
 3. So, my present pb is reasonable (likely to be true). 
Now let us turn to the question of the source of the reasonableness of ordinary pb’s. 
What confers warrant on these beliefs in this Sellarsian account? Initially it can be said that 
their warrant comes from the subject’s reasons, viz., the beliefs that are formulated in the 
premises of JA. But this cannot be the whole story. We must not forget that the beliefs in 
question have a propositional content, and therefore (if true) are bearers of descriptive in-
formation from without. Thus we can see the appropriateness of saying that the grounds 
of ordinary pb’s lie in objective factors in the environment—viz., the physical circumstances 
that surround the pb and give rise to it. 
Compare how it is with having legal evidence. In a court of law when a prosecutor pre-
sents the evidence on the basis of which she seeks to convict, she does not appeal to her 
believings as such, but describes certain putative facts and happenings : the defendant said 
this and did that. Her evidence consists of these facts. But of course, it remains true that in 
so far as they constitute her grounds for her belief that the defendant is guilty, they are the 
content of beliefs that she has about those facts. 
Similarly, in perceptual cases, the subject recognizes that it is objective factors in the 
physical environment (such as that his eyes are being stimulated in the appropriate way 
by the object), and in his perceptual past (that pb’s of the kind he is having have tended to 
be correlated with their objects) that ground his belief. It is important not to overlook the 
place of these objective considerations in the evidence that perceivers actually have in or-
dinary cases. On this view, then, the subject’s grasp of the context of his experience is ep-
istemically on a par with his awareness of the character of that experience. It might be 
thought that this appeal to external grounds flies in the face of our internalist assumption 
(Int1) that only beliefs can justify other beliefs. But this apparent contradiction disappears 
once it is seen that objective factors, by themselves, cannot confer justification on any belief 
except as the subject takes account of them, and fits them into the pattern of justificatory 
reasoning that I have described.12 We turn now to an important objection that has been 
brought against the Sellarsian model of justification. 
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Alston’s Objection 
 
In his paper “What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?” (1983), William Alston consid-
ers Sellars’ view of perceptual justification as formulated in the several papers we have 
mentioned. In some lucid expository remarks, Alston brings out the way in which, for 
Sellars, a pb depends for its justification “on some higher-level reasons that have to do 
with its epistemic status“ (p. 80). Specifically, it depends on the subject’s awareness of “the 
relevant facts about what gives [the] utterance its ‘authority’” (p. 83). (It will be convenient 
if we begin to refer to these higher-level beliefs as “epistemic beliefs.”) 
Presumably Alston thinks that ordinary perceivers do not in fact rely on any epistemic 
beliefs and do not need to in order to have justified beliefs. He launches his attack on Sellars 
by focusing on some passages that suggest that perceivers not only have higher-level rea-
sons, but could actually bring them forward, in the manner of Jones, to support the rea-
sonableness of their pb’s. Alston then points out that we frequently take ourselves to know 
things even if we cannot say how we know them, or produce any very good evidence for 
them. And presumably, he thinks that perceivers also have knowledge, but cannot say 
very much about what justifies it. 
Sellars‘ “higher-level slant on justification” reflects the “widespread tendency of episte-
mologists to think of knowledge as the exclusive possession of critically reflective sub-
jects,” namely those “philosophers and other choice spirits who have achieved a consider-
able ability in making explicit what it takes to render one or another sort of belief rational“ 
(p. 85). Alston is posing a dilemma for the strong internalist: either admit ordinary per-
ceivers into the ranks of epistemologists, or exclude them from the community of percep-
tual knowers. 
In response to this objection, it seems that Sellars is committed to the view that ordinary 
perceivers do have the capacity to produce their evidence. My reason for thinking this is 
that Jones’ reasoning, after all, is not overly sophisticated. It is true that many—perhaps 
most—ordinary perceivers would need some tutoring in the business of finding their per-
ceptual grounds, for they surely are not right on the surface of consciousness. But for all 
that, it could be maintained that all of us could, with proper guidance, follow Jones’ lead 
and give expression to our grounds. 
But the main issue between Alston and Sellars seems to boil down to whether ordinary 
perceivers have at all the sorts of epistemic beliefs we have described. I do not think it is 
far-fetched to say that ordinary perceivers do appreciate that their perceptual beliefs are 
based on (adequate) evidence. This awareness is manifested not only in their capacity to 
ask, and give answers to, questions about what justifies them , but also, and more so, in 
their ability to recognize when and for what reasons they are not justified in their percep-
tual beliefs. Ordinary contexts such as these: 
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1. I shouldn’t have been so hasty in thinking it was Sally on the beach. She was 
too far away for me to be certain. 
2. I thought I saw someone entering the garage last night, but I can’t be sure 
because it was getting dark and I may have been influenced by my own fears. 
show not only an awareness of the sorts of conditions that can defeat one’s pb, but also 
the realization that one does not have the right to one’s belief as long as one believes that 
these unfavorable conditions obtain. 
But even if these sorts of examples show that ordinary pb’s are couched in a context of 
evidence and reasons, we may well wonder whether they show that perceivers are think-
ing that surrounding conditions are favorable for seeing before any doubt arises . Take the 
first case. A question has arisen as to whether I did see Sally on the beach. I remind myself 
that she was pretty far off, and there was the strong glare. Although I had no doubt at the 
time, I now have a doubt, and let us suppose that this doubt leads me to conclude that I 
did not see Sally because she was not within my perceptual range. I originally thought that 
I had enough to go on, and specifically that Sally was within range, but I now judge that I 
was mistaken in believing this. My original pb has now been overruled because the evi-
dence I was relying on has been impugned. It is plausible, then, to construe this case as one 
in which I am questioning the grounds I had for my perceptual belief when I first unques-
tioningly asserted it. Perhaps these remarks are enough to show that ordinary perceivers 
do recognize that their perceptual beliefs are grounded. 
 
The Justification of Premises and Normal Conditions 
 
We will now take up the question of whether we must put a further requirement on “S‘s 
having a justification for p,” namely that the premises of S’s justificatory argument must 
be justified for S. If S accepts p for the reason that r, but S is not justified in accepting r, 
then it would seem that S is not justified in accepting p. The point seems to have intuitive 
support : premises that are mere guesses, or that are themselves based on evidence that is 
suspect, presumably do not confer justification on their conclusions. 
If this is so, then we are led to ask: what possible justifications are there for the premises 
of our perceptual justificatory arguments? and is it plausible to think that ordinary per-
ceivers have them? Let us begin with the first premise of JA: S believes that his pb is occurring 
in normal conditions. Call this belief P1. As we have seen , what the subject believes is that 
certain specific external conditions are present, together with the further generalization 
that no countervailing conditions obtain. Some of the specific conditions that seem to be 
involved in S’s belief P1 in ordinary visual cases are (from S‘s perspective): 
1. that the lighting is normal 
2. that the object is an appropriate distance from me 
3. that the object is sufficiently in view (not obscured) 
4. that the object is stimulating my eyes in the appropriate and usual way 
5. that my eyes are working properly. 
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What strikes us immediately about these conditions is that some (and perhaps all) of them 
are things S observes when S perceives the object that is there before him. If this is so, then 
it would seem that S‘s premise-belief (or the relevant part of it pertaining to these condi-
tions) is itself a kind of pb and so, presumably, is justified in the same manner as the original 
pb. What justifies S in the pb that the lighting is good is (his recognition) that his perceptual 
experience of the lighting is occurring in certain (more restricted) conditions, and that ex-
periences of this kind are reliable. 
But even if ordinary perceptual beliefs do in this way usually rest on other perceptions, 
it seems clear, first of all, that justification along these lines comes to an end pretty quickly, 
and moreover that any evidence that involved pb‘s occurring in more restricted circum-
stances would depend on the same sort of justificatory argument as the original pb, and 
thus would reintroduce the same problems we are trying to resolve. We are simply robbing 
Peter to pay Paul if we fail to see that these other perceptual beliefs depend just as much 
for their justification on some belief about normal conditions as does the original pb. 
It is, however, helpful to see that one‘s premise-belief about normal conditions, P1, is, in 
large part, a belief about perceptual conditions, and hence that the original pb is supported 
in part by other concurrent pb’s. Moreover, once this is seen, then there is some basis for 
thinking that the general component of P1, that no countervailing conditions obtain, is itself 
partially grounded in what one positively perceives. One believes on the basis of what one 
is perceiving that other (unseen) conditions are normal as well. 
My claim is that S‘s original pb derives justification from P1, and that P1 includes a non-
perceptual, general component that is partially grounded in what S is actively perceiving. 
However, a question can now be raised as to whether the “current” of justification is one-
way (from P1 to pb) or reciprocal. For, as BonJour has pointed out (1985, p. 126), even the 
original pb may provide some grounds for P1. We believe that we are in normal circum-
stances in part because of the character of our spontaneous pb’s. It is interferences in the 
normal, expected flow of pb‘s that cause us to think twice about possible abnormalities in 
our situation. 
But even if there is such a pattern of mutual justification between premise and conclusion, 
it seems clear that it cannot account for all the justification that the relevant perceptual 
beliefs have. At best, these relations of mutual support can strengthen and reinforce the 
justification that each of them already has and must have gotten from some other source. 
We must then look to the whole justificatory argument (JA), including the epistemic belief, 
to find the (full) source of their warrant.13 
The second important feature of conditions 1–5 is that they seem to involve beliefs or 
presuppositions about the causal interactions of physical objects, and specifically the ef-
fects of objects on perceivers (or on the sensory apparatus of perceivers). This is evident in 
conditions 1, 4, and 5 . Thus one’s evidence in perceptual cases is shot through with causal 
assumptions, and it seems that perceivers need some justification for these assumptions. 
But if they do, then we have opened ourselves again to Alston‘s criticism, for we are mak-
ing perceptual beliefs depend on beliefs that even philosophers have great difficulty justi-
fying. Thus if perceptual knowledge depends on causal assumptions, how are we to stop 
from skidding into the requirement that ordinary perceivers must have come to grips at 
some level with the problem of induction? Although I cannot begin to deal with the many-
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sided problem of induction in this paper, I will make a suggestion, at a later stage, about 
how perceivers might be justified in applying an inductive principle. But first we need to 
consider possible grounds for epistemic beliefs. 
 
Justifying Epistemic Beliefs 
 
The second premise of the justificatory argument, JA, is what we have called an epistemic 
belief or warrant principle that has the general form: 
P2 Pb‘s of a certain kind that occur in (normal) circumstances a, b, c . . . are 
likely to be true 
I have argued that perceivers make use of a range of warrant principles of this kind which 
correspond to the different types of perceptual objects and situations they encounter. Thus 
when Seymour perceives a green glass in front of him, the instantiation of P2 that he applies 
would look like this: 
P2i Pb‘s about green, translucent, glass-shaped objects that occur in good light-
ing, etc., are likely to be true14 
We must now consider a difficulty that arises when we begin to think about whether a 
perceiver has any grounds for P2. We have just seen how perceptual beliefs depend on 
other perceived facts about external conditions. Moreover, it was mentioned earlier that the 
use of an epistemic belief in a particular case is the application to one’s experience of a 
standard of correctness, a criterion for the (probable) truth of a particular pb, and thus pre-
supposes that the subject already has ascertained the conditions in which that kind of pb is 
likely to be true. If so, then it may well be asked how the perceiver has established this 
standard of correctness. Specifically it may be noted that P2 is a generalization based some-
how on the subject’s previous observational experience of objects and situations of the kind 
in question, in which case an obvious regress opens up.15 Our account of the justification 
of perceptual belief would presuppose that the subject already has perceptual knowledge 
of the very kind we seek to explain. This regress problem can be given either a temporal 
form in which case it is argued that empirical justifications can‘t get started, or it can be 
put in the form of a logical dependence which emphasizes the circularity just mentioned. 
And so we need to consider the grounds that subjects might have for their epistemic beliefs 
not only because of the general requirement that the premises of their justificatory argu-
ments must themselves be justified, but also in order to counter this potential regress. 
And it is plausible to think that the perceptual epistemic belief in question does ulti-
mately rest on the subject‘s past experience of having had the appropriate pb in circum-
stances in which it was and was not reliable. I say ultimately because once the subject has 
acquired a stock of empirical knowledge, then he might be able to tell about some new 
perception, on its first occurrence, that it is not reliable, on the basis of what he already 
knows. (That portrait of mother is so life-like that her eyes seem to be following me around 
the room, but surely they aren’t moving.) But presumably (the objection goes) the reliabil-
ity of some basic set of pb’s is in some way grounded in the verifying procedures that one 
employs to determine whether those beliefs are veridical. And surely these truth-testing 
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procedures depend on making the relevant observations. Specifically, it seems that certain 
practical routines involving observation are necessary if a subject is to acquire the ideas of 
(i) a pb occurring in such-and-such conditions, and (ii) a pb being reliable (in those condi-
tions). For example, a perceiver, S, acquires knowledge of the conditions in which his pb 
of a green glass is reliable by having a range of green glass experiences in a variety of 
circumstances. He notes that when the circumstances change, his pb sometimes changes 
with them. What was green now has a purple cast when viewed next to these other objects. 
Typically, the subject intervenes in the situation, altering conditions and then taking note 
of the altered perceptual outcome. S then packages a range of experiences-cum-conditions 
that are reliably connected with their object. At the same time S separates these from other 
experiences-cum-conditions that cannot be relied on. Presumably then S’s epistemic belief 
presupposes that S has noticed correlations between a certain range of his experiences and 
objective features of the situation in which that experience occurs, and it seems that S 
would have to rely heavily on his observations in carrying out this experimental activity. 
And the regress threatens. 
I think that Sellars’ oft-cited reply to this type of argument is worth citing once more, as 
it does effectively remove the challenge (1963, pp. 168–69). Put simply, the idea is that S 
only begins to have observational knowledge—and justified pb’s—when he becomes 
aware of his evidence for those beliefs, that is, recognizes the conditions in which they are 
likely to be true. S’s observational knowledge and the epistemic beliefs on which it is based 
both come into being at once. Thus it can be allowed on this view that S’s pb’s are indeed 
grounded in prior experiences, namely the experiences involved in the sorts of truth-test-
ing procedures that we have just described, but that these experiences, to which S later 
appeals in support of his epistemic beliefs, were not instances of observational knowledge 
when they occurred. S’s outward perceptual responses might have mimicked full-fledged 
observations, but they would have failed to be such in virtue of their not being incorpo-
rated into a framework of reasons. 
Sellars puts the argument in this way: if a perceiver (Jones) is justified in his pb, then it 
is required that 
he now knows the appropriate fact of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y. . . . And 
while the correctness of this statement about Jones requires that Jones could now 
cite prior particular facts as evidence for the idea that these utterances are reliable 
indicators, and hence that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that these partic-
ular facts did obtain, it does not require that it be correct to say that at the time 
these facts did obtain he then knew them to obtain. And the regress disappears 
(1963, p. 169). 
 
The Sellarsian solution gives us a way of explaining the fact that one can only form 
epistemic beliefs after one has had a long history of perceptual encounters with things, 
while still maintaining that observations, as states of knowledge, get their warrant from 
those epistemic beliefs. It is important to see that Sellars is asserting that Jones not only has 
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evidence for his premise-belief that X is a reliable symptom of Y, but that he can cite evi-
dence for that belief. Thus Jones’ justificatory repertoire is even more extensive than we 
earlier supposed. 
It should also be noted that the evidence cited involves as an element a further external 
ground for Jones’ pb, viz., a source of justification lying outside of his (cognitive) perspec-
tive. For the subjective states that figure in the empirical regularities underlying Jones’ ep-
istemic belief are not conceptual states of which he was aware when they occurred. They 
do of course become part of Jones’ perspective and part of his evidence when he later con-
ceptualizes and remembers them. But in this regard they are no different than the external 
circumstances which also become part of Jones’ evidence. 
A question that might be asked at this point is whether it is plausible to think that Jones 
could cite the particular facts in question as evidence for his belief. Jones may have origi-
nally relied on an accumulation of experience in forming P2, but once P2 has become estab-
lished in his belief repertoire, wouldn’t he quickly forget the preconceptual experiences 
that led to it and initially constituted its ground? Would he need to remember these expe-
riences in order to be justified later in applying P2? I can see no reason to think that Jones 
does, or should, retain these states in memory or that Jones is relying on any set of partic-
ular prior experiences when he employs P2. And yet it is reasonable to think that Jones 
realizes that he has some evidence of this kind, viz., that P2 is grounded in an indeterminate 
range of past experiences relating to, e.g., green, translucent, glass-shaped objects. And if 
this sort of belief is part of Jones’ actual cognitive state when he applies P2, as I am main-
taining, then he does have some justifying grounds for it. 
 
The Criterial Status of Epistemic Beliefs 
 
There is however, another deeper objection that can be brought against the view that I am 
defending. It can be argued that there is a peculiar problem about saying that epistemic 
beliefs could be grounded in past perceptual experiences. The problem arises from the fact 
that these beliefs (or rather the epistemic principles they express) have a criterial or nor-
mative status. They are warrant principles that lay down the conditions in which a pb is to 
be accepted. But how could a principle that determines criteria of acceptability for percep-
tual beliefs itself be grounded in particular perceptual beliefs? The objection naturally 
leads to the view that epistemic principles are prior to experience (a priori), and therefore 
cannot be grounded in experience. 
I wish to defend the different view that while epistemic principles do have a criterial 
status (and are in this sense prior to experience), they are nevertheless grounded in expe-
rience.16 In particular, they presuppose and are grounded in the empirical regularities that 
we described in the last section. We argued there that in the process of forming epistemic 
beliefs, perceivers select a set of previous experiences-cum-conditions that are reliably con-
nected with their objects. The epistemic belief then endorses a current pb because it fits 
into this larger pattern of perceptual experience. It is only as belonging to this pattern that 
the pb becomes a candidate for its approved epistemic status. Hence the door is open for 
saying that these principles derive their justification from their “explanatory coherence” 
with these perceptual facts (and with other parts of the perceiver’s system of beliefs). The 
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perceptual facts in question are the regular connections, that occur in the process of learn-
ing to perceive, between the perceiver’s perceptual reports and their objects. 
While the a-priorist may well agree that epistemic principles fit with these phenomena, 
and thus account for them, he would certainly balk at the idea that they play any stronger 
explanatory role. Certainly, as warrant principles, their function is not merely explanatory. 
On the other hand, they seem to resemble theoretical principles in science in several crucial 
respects. First, they appear to be, in a sense, subject to revision on the basis of “ongoing 
experience. “It is of course unlikely that the warrant principles on which ordinary percep-
tual judgments depend will be overthrown or even shift in any significant way. Neverthe-
less it may be instructive to think about the sorts of pressures that could force an extension 
or revision of current standards. Thus revision could come as a result of an increased un-
derstanding of the conditions in which certain pb’s, hitherto suspect, are reliable. For ex-
ample, as we become more aware of the conditions in which blind people are aware of 
color through touch, or sense the presence of objects in their vicinity, we will be more apt 
to credit them with perceptual knowledge. It should be remembered that there are many 
different spontaneous perceptual (or quasi-perceptual) beliefs, ranging from extrasensory 
perceptions to experiences of God, which are currently not credited but which claim to be 
knowledge. Further inquiry may specify conditions under which some of these claims are 
reliable.17 
Secondly, the idea that epistemic beliefs are explanatory fits with the way in which our 
account of perceptual evidence has had to appeal to other sorts of presumed knowledge. 
In particular, it should now be clear that the epistemic belief, P2, rests on other kinds of 
knowledge—specifically (1) introspective knowledge about one’s occurrent belief-state, (2) 
memories of past pb’s, and (3) the recognition that one’s present pb resembles those others. 
Thus it is likely that there are other epistemic principles relating to those other kinds of 
knowledge, which are a part of the perceiver’s belief system, and that the perceptual epis-
temic belief we have been considering receives “lateral” support from its coherence with 
them.18 And further, any evidence that perceivers have for an overarching principle of in-
duction would also connect with each of these epistemic principles, and thus indirectly 
with the various low-level beliefs falling under them. 
But we must finally face the question whether ordinary perceivers are aware that P2 gets 
its warrant from the fact that it has the explanatory function we have sketched and from 
its coherence with other epistemic principles? The question is important for us because we 
have accepted the requirement that the premises of a justifying argument must be justified 
for the subject. I am inclined to say that our commonsense view does include some minimal 
grasp of the explanatory coherence of perceptual epistemic beliefs, mainly because of the 
way these beliefs are linked to empirical regularities in one’s past experience. We have 
seen that epistemic beliefs collect and sanction pb’s that are reliably connected with their 
objects. Perceivers recognize that a current pb is justified because it fits into a larger pattern 
of like pb’s in like circumstances that is truth-conducive. And it seems to me a short step 
from this awareness to the recognition that the epistemic belief is justified because it coheres 
with this pattern of events. Further, perceivers recognize that their perceptual justifications 
depend on other kinds of knowledge, and hence that perceptual justification may interlock 
with other kinds of justification. 
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In these ways, ordinary perceivers give evidence of a partial apprehension of the ex-
planatory coherence of their epistemic beliefs. Nevertheless I have serious doubts about 
saying that they have anything approaching the full justification we have given for the 
epistemic premise-belief P2. My reasons are, first, that the justification we proposed relied 
heavily on an analogy with the justification philosophers of science have given for empir-
ical hypotheses and theories. This model of explanation in science apparently involves 
some rather sophisticated ideas about the formation of hypotheses, their explanatory rele-
vance to observables, their falsifiability, and their support from other hypotheses and the-
ories. And it is doubtful that non-specialists have a very well-developed grasp of this 
technical apparatus. Secondly, our justification was offered in the context of a general the-
ory of justification which asserts that pb’s derive all their warrant from their relations to 
other beliefs. But I am reluctant to attribute any such systematic beliefs to ordinary observ-
ers. Clearly, for example, any notion of coherence they may have would lack the contras-
tive meaning (with other theories) that ours possesses. It is even doubtful whether ordinary 
people have a general theory of justification. What they think about their grounds doesn’t 
cut that wide or that deep and would probably be compatible with any of the current rival 
theories of justification. Epistemologists should recognize that their accounts of justifica-
tion are constructions that extend and elaborate ordinary beliefs, and are only crudely con-
tained in them. But the fact that epistemologists can give fuller or deeper grounds for 
ordinary pb’s and their premises does not take away from the degree of justification ordi-
nary perceivers do have; it only shows that they could have more. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The crucial claim of this paper has been that ordinary perceivers do have justifying reasons 
for their perceptual beliefs and are aware that they do. We have tried to defend Sellars’ 
insight that “to be the expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this 
authority must in some sense be recognized by the person whose report it is.” We at-
tempted to defend the strong internalist position by using it to illuminate the perceptual 
case; but at the same time it was argued that the subject’s grounds include significant de-
scriptive elements, and hence that there is an external ground for perception. The evidence 
that ordinary perceivers bring to bear in perception includes (1) a belief about the external 
conditions in which the perceptual belief is occurring, and (2) an epistemic belief that per-
ceivings that occur in conditions of that sort are reasonable ones. We noted that the sub-
ject’s premise-belief about external conditions consists largely in other concurrent 
perceptual beliefs (whose justification also depends crucially on appropriate epistemic be-
liefs.) Further, we saw that the epistemic belief is grounded in the subject’s awareness that 
his experience-cum-conditions fits into a larger pattern of similar past experiences that are 
reliably connected with their objects. This realization opened the door for saying that ep-
istemic beliefs—and the warrant principles they embody—are grounded in experience be-
cause they are justified by their explanatory coherence with these sets of empirical 
regularities that occur in perceivers’ pasts.* 
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Endnotes 
 
* I am indebted to William Alston, Joseph Camp, Anthony Skillen, Robert Audi, Timothy Day, Ar-
thur Walker, John Hare, and Keith Lehrer for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
l. A fuller account of Seymour’s perceptual state (and of a perceptual belief) would bring out that 
it has a far richer content than the propositional content-cum-attitude mentioned. It has, in ad-
dition, a sensuous character whereby the particular sensible qualities, of, e.g., greenness and 
translucence, and the particular shape of the glass, enter into the experience, are in some way 
instantiated in it, but not simply in the way of being thought about. Greenness, for example, 
enters into Seymour’s experience in two guises—as conceived and as sensed. 
2. I have defended the idea that ordinary perceptual beliefs are noninferential in the epistemolog-
ical sense in Crawford (1982). 
3. William Alston (1985) has ably defended the primacy of this concept of justification. 
4. For a useful precising of the family of expressions pertaining to reasons occurring in ordinary 
usage, see Robert Audi (1986, pp. 29–31). 
5. Most notably Carl Ginet (1975), and Robert Audi in a number of recent essays. 
6. Alston has distinguished these two senses of having evidence. The first he calls the “mere posses-
sion” sense, and contrasts it with the “on the basis of” sense (1985, pp.74–75). 
7. See BonJour’s helpful discussion of the idea that epistemic justification is sought and valued by 
rational beings as the means by which they can achieve the cognitive goal of truth (1985, pp. 5–
8). 
8. I will not attempt to evaluate the bold position, recently advanced by some epistemologists with 
a foundational bent, most notably William Alston and Robert Audi, that noncognitive states, 
e.g., sensory experiences, can also justify beliefs. 
9. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” is reprinted in (Sellars, 1963, pp. 127–96). References 
to “The Structure of Knowledge” (Sellars, 1975) are included in the text. I have also benefited 
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from Laurence BonJour’s paper (1978), “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?,” espe-
cially section III. 
10. In his discussion of perceptual knowledge in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Sellars 
explicitly introduces this generalization as part of an observer ‘s grounds. If an utterance of “this 
is green” expresses observational knowledge, then the subject must “know that overt verbal 
episodes of this kind are reliable indicators of the existence, suitably related to the speaker, of 
green objects” (1963, p. 168). 
11. In a more recent essay Sellars puts the conclusion in terms of the (probable) truth of the pb. (See 
Sellars, 1979, pp. 172–77.) In “Phenomenalism,” Sellars gives an even more reduced version of 
his inference schema: 
x’s thought that p occurred in manner M 
So (probably) p 
He refers to it as a “trans-level inference” because it involves the sort of epistemic appraisal that 
we have described. It is to be contrasted with same-level perceptual inferences of which the fol-
lowing is an illustration: 
Lo, there is a largish bird with a red breast 
So there is a robin. 
(Sellars, 1963, p. 88). 
12. However, it must be admitted that Int1 is misleading and fails to indicate that the source of one’s 
justification lies not in the justifying belief qua belief, but in its content. Int1 (and indeed all three 
internalist conditions) should be viewed as positing formal requirements on otherwise specified 
types of evidence and not as themselves material principles of evidence. 
13. It is worth noting that we seem to have found in this small constellation of beliefs a model of 
what the coherentist might mean in saying that the beliefs in one’s overall belief-system are 
“mutually justifying”—a claim that is obviously crucial in extricating that position from the “re-
gress of reasons.” 
14. In the following discussion of P2, I should be taken to be referring to these particular instantia-
tions of P2. 
15. Sellars formulates this second type of regress explicitly in (1963, paragraphs 36–37, pp. 168–69). 
16. In the next few paragraphs I am developing an idea that I find most c1early stated in Sellars’ 
essay “More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence” (1979, sec. IV, pp. 176–181). 
17. If warrant principles are theoretical principles that are grounded in experience, then we can see 
another way in which one’s justifying reasons are mutually supporting. For the perceptual claims 
that warrant principles validate are exactly the same reports that enter into the regularities on 
which those principles are themselves grounded, and which constitute an ongoing body of fact 
that the principles must agree with. The point suggests a way of stopping the regress of reasons. 
18. Sellars argues that epistemic principles relating to introspection, perception, and memory to-
gether form a theory which is reasonably accepted (in part) because it coheres with our intro-
spective, perceptual, and memory judgments. The other part of its reasonableness comes from 
an overarching ground that, as agents, we require “cognitive maps of ourselves and our envi-
ronment” to achieve any goals (1979, p. 180). 
